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AGO ltr 11 Jun 1980

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OFFICE OF THE PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR  
KIEN TUONG PROVINCE, MR-4  
CORDS ADVISORY TEAM 85  
APO 96215

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
5 February 1973

SUBJECT: AFRIS-Province Advisor Completion of Tour Report  
(RCS: MACCORDS 174-03) COL ROBERT L. BURGESS, 250-34-7848

ADB001518

THRU: DEPCORDS  
Delta Regional Assistance Command  
APO 96215

TO: Headquarters  
Military Assistance Command Vietnam  
ATTN: MACCORDS, (ACofS, CORDS)  
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AU NO. 1  
DDC FILE COPY

1. Attached is the Province Advisor's Completion of Tour Report for the period 17 August 1972 to 28 January 1973.

2. Eventhough I have served in this assignment a relatively short period of time, it has been most enjoyable, regarding and challenging. This is the first time I have come into contact with the CORDS organization since its inception in 1967. In all candor, I must admit a shift in attitude from initial cynicism to that of being a staunch supporter. The personnel, both military and civilians, are among the most dedicated I have ever had the privilege to be associated with. The support rendered to the team by all echelons has been outstanding and highly appreciated.

3. My assessment of Vietnamization in Kien Tuong Province is that it has been very successful in spite of the fact that weak links do exist. The structure has been built and the ground work laid that will enhance continuing development, security and self-sufficiency. I have the highest confidence in the professional qualities of the current Province Chief and feel that he will continue to perform in a creditable manner. I would be remiss however, to imply that all is rosy within. I cannot say anything that hasn't already been said many times before about corruption. The Province has its share. There is still a credibility gap at the local levels and much remains to be done in the area of concerned care. I have a gut feel that much of the public display in support of GVN is artificial, or at any rate superficial and perfunctory, eventhough strides have been made during recent political indoctrination campaigns. More remains to be done than has been done in mobilizing public sentiment and making the goals and values of GVN become a reality at hamlet and village level.

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MACDR-CR85/KT

5 February 1973

SUBJECT: AFRIS-Province Advisor Completion of Tour Report

(RCS: MACCORDS 174-03) COL. ROBERT L. BURGESS, 250-34-7848

*IT IS A STRONG*

4. I recommend *strong* follow-on actions at the national level to eliminate corruption. I have heard plenty of lip service along these lines but I have not seen any heads roll. It is a mockery of justice to send a major on a one day trip to investigate significant allegations against a Lieutenant Colonel Police Chief which was the case in this province. At the local level, priority follow-on advisory efforts should be directed at taxation and village self development. Top priority should also be given to the development of an irrigation system. *✓*



ROBERT L. BURGESS

Colonel, IN

Province Senior Advisor

SECTION I

NAME: ROBERT L. BURGESS

GRADE: COLONEL

SSAN: 250-34-7848

BRANCH OF SERVICE: INF

PROVINCE: KIEN TUONG

INCLUSIVE DATES OF TOUR: 17 AUGUST 1972 - 28 JANUARY 1973

EXPECTED REASSIGNMENT DATE:

PREVIOUS TOUR(S) IN VIETNAM (DATE - INCLUSIVE): JUN 1966 - JUN 1967

ASSIGNMENT ON PREVIOUS VIETNAM TOUR(S): REGTL SENIOR ADVISOR  
DIV G-3 ADVISOR

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## SECTION II

1. What background did you have for your position?

21 years experience, college graduate , several military schools; including CGSC.

2. What training did you have for this position?

3 months operations and language training at FSI.

3. What additional training would you suggest for your position?

Full length Vietnamese Language Course.

4. What should be the length of tour for your position?

Eighteen months with the option to extend for six additional months.

5. Was support from Region and/or Saigon Headquarters satisfactory? If not, specify deficiencies.

I encountered no difficulties with support from Region or Saigon. All supports elements were very cooperative and helpful.

6. Were there any programs delayed because support was not forthcoming? Were there any programs that were especially successful because support was readily available? Which ones?

Generally program success was proportionate to the support provided. with Phung Hoang and Social Welfare being the exception. These programs received good support but results were very marginal.

7. Do the reporting requirements as set forth in Joint Directive 2-69 provide a means for reporting all information of present and future value? If not, what changes would you recommend?

Generally, yes. In those cases a PSA feels he has something significant to report which is not required there is nothing to prevent a separate letter report being submitted.

8. Do the MACCORDS Management Information System Field Reporting requirements set forth in Joint Directive 2-69 adequately measure progress in pacification programs?

No, adequate but too standardized to cover all conditions in all provinces.

9. Were instructions from higher headquarters clear with no conflicting requirements? If not, what specific instances occurred where conflicting instructions were received?

Generally few problems were encountered on conflicting requirements.

ANSWER 10-15 BY GIVING AN ORDER OF PRIORITY.  
QUESTIONS

10. The most clearly defined and directed programs are:

1. Agriculture
2. Public Health
3. Taxation

11. The most effective para military forces are:

1. RD Cadre
2. PSDF
3. PRU

12. The most successful pacification programs are:

1. Public Health
2. ADB
3. PSDF

13. The programs that have the greatest impact upon the pacification effort are:

1. People's organizations
2. Agriculture Development Bank
3. National Police

14. The least successful pacification programs are:

1. Eradication of Social Evils
2. Social Welfare
3. National Police

15. The programs that have the least impact upon the pacification effort are:

1. Land Reform
2. PTT- Communications services
3. Chieu Hoi

16. The rural people are aware of the pacification efforts the GVN and US are making. In most cases VIS does a good job of making the information available.

There is an urgent requirement for eye ball to eye ball contact between military and civilian leaders and the people.

17. The people, as you know them, are more committed to the GVN than when you assumed your job. Why?

Yes, because of the intensified political indoctrination that they have been subject to recently in preparation for a cease fire.

18. Do you feel that the pacification plan is sufficiently detailed to provide guidance and set goals that will result in security and growth of Vietnam?

Yes, however the problem is to make the plans and goals a reality at hamlet and village level. Sometimes there is more lip service than actual results.

19. Do you feel that the pacification plan was adequately communicated and explained to you and your counterpart?

N/A

SECTION III  
FUNCTIONAL AREAS

TERRITORAIL SECURITY DIRECTORATE

RF/PF: Territorial Forces in Kien Tuong are capable of providing security for the population against local enemy forces, and have performed well in doing so. Because of the vast unpopulated land area and the small population base from which to recruit additional forces, it is not possible for territorial forces to control infiltration at present strength levels. Throughout the province it is estimated that a minimum of four RF battalions would be needed to secure the 80% of Kien Tuong which is not populated. Territorial forces are well trained but more emphasis needs to be placed on training small unit leaders to instill confidence and cohesiveness in platoon and squad sized elements.

PSDF: The PSDF has generally acquitted itself well although no real tests have occurred. Their effectiveness is directly proportional to the efforts of the village chief and deputy for security. This para-military organization should be exploited to act as a springboard in developing other peoples organizations and in turn foster a sense of cohesiveness at lower levels.

PUBLIC SAFETY DIRECTORATE

NPFF: The Field Police have a total strength of 236 men divided into five platoons. One platoon is assigned to each of the four districts and one is in the province city. In Moc Hoa, the primary duty of the Field Police Platoon is providing security for the police compound. Operations of less than 24 hours are conducted infrequently. In the districts the Field Police seldom conduct operations, their primary mission again being static security. With the present security conditions, the Field Police can and should be conducting frequent extended operations and their failure to do so is a reflection of the general level of police competence.

NP Operations: In general, the National Police is the most ineffective and corrupt GVN agency in the province. They are not responsive to government officials at any level, including the province chief. This unresponsiveness, in my opinion, is inherent in the national organizational structure. Additionally, there is a definite lack of communication and coordination between the police and the military where such interface should be the rule rather than the exception. Recent evidence indicates that corruption in the police starts at the top and permeates the entire force. Their effectiveness is further hampered by the fact that only 36% of the uniformed police are assigned to village level instead of the 50% national objective. At this critical period when widely known corruption could seriously hamper the total effort of the GVN to convince the people of its desire to give them a better life, it is imperative that immediate and positive steps be taken to remove and punish guilty officials. Without such action on the part of the GVN, the (continued on page 8)

people will be reluctant to assist in eliminating subversive elements in the province, and will continue to despise the National Police.

#### COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DIRECTORATE

VSD: This program should be modified so as to provide monetary assistance only to those villages which have virtually no chance to become self-sufficient on their own. As it now stands, the assurance of supplementary income to all villages amounts to a negative incentive in developing additional income-producing programs. Some projects have been poorly constructed or abandoned and funds apparently misappropriated.

RD Cadre: This is one of the most effective programs in Kien Tuong. The cadre are very active and provide much needed influence through their presence at the village level. In addition to political and morale building functions, they also are deeply involved in RD credit, the Postal Service, monitoring VSD projects and land reform. It is recommended RD Cadre retained at the present level and that periodic refresher training courses be conducted.

Ethnic Minorities: Not significant in Kien Tuong.

Local Government: Since mid September 1972 the local governments have been receiving more and more emphasis as evidenced by the quantity and quality of PMGT visits. The province has completed its program for training government officials and has conducted two make-up classes for 87 people who did not attend regularly scheduled sessions. Eventhough the 1972 training goals were met, much is to be desired in the way of effective inst. tion and quality training. Generally local government officials are adequate with only a few exceptions. Nhon Ninh Village Chief is the poorest and perhaps most corrupt and should be closely watched and removed for cause at an opportune time. There are still cases where village and hamlet official are believed to spend the night else where in spite of what the HES report indicates. Since the village and hamlet officials are the first point of contact with GVN, increased emphasis should be given in the area of training, emphasizing administration, leadership and inter-personal communications.

Aid in Kind: In my opinion AIK Funds are absolutely essential as long as any advisors remain. They play an important part in the pacification effort, provide flexibility for anticipated essential projects, are the solution for many emergencies, and are about the only leverage instrument remaining. AIK Funds have been found to be most effective when used in a joint self help type projects.

#### REFUGEE DIRECTORATE

Refugee: Refugees have never entered Kien Tuong in numbers sufficient to become a problem. The Province economy could easily handle several thousand displaced person for a short time. For resettlement purposes, if properly spaced, the province could absorb 3 to 4 thousand farmers.

Social Welfare: This program has the poorest record of all government agencies in Kien Tuong and has been plagued by poor leadership and inefficient administration. As a result of previous mismanagement of funds, the service has been reluctant to distribute funds without extensive documentation and, coupled with slow responses to disasters such as the enemy invasion, have thereby rendered themselves ineffective in promoting government policies. In order to upgrade the service to an acceptable level, a general replacement of leadership and staff is needed to overcome the present stagnation and lack of coordination on the part of SWS at all levels of provincial government. Those individuals appointed Social Welfare Commissioner at the village level should receive functional and motivational training as well.

#### CHIEU HOI DIRECTORATE

Chieu Hoi: Region's proposal to reduce the staff and create a reception center is appropriate in light of the small number of Hoi Chanh annually received.

#### REPORTS AND ANALYSIS DIRECTORATE

Report Requirements: Many reports require information which was previously submitted or which is available from Vietnamese counterparts. Advisors at the province level should not be required to obtain information when the same information has been submitted through VN channels and is already available at higher levels where it can be better colated and analysed.

Feedback Report: Significant trends and findings are useful and interesting. Comparisons with other provinces provide useful overviews. Intelligence report among provinces leaves much to be desired.

#### PHUNG HOANG DIRECTORATE

The Phung Hoang Program in Kien Tuong suffers from a number of ailments and produces generally unsatisfactory results. The assumption by the NP of the responsibility for the program has produced no improvement. The opposite may in fact be the base due to the general inefficiency of the police and the corruption which evidently premeates their ranks from top to bottom. The first step toward a successful program must be an upgrading of the police, primarily removal of corrupt officials. As previously pointed out, the vast and insecure land areas of the province require police and military cooperation in the goal of neutralizing the communists. The Vietnamese apparently do not understand or do not care to pursue the technique of specific targetting of individuals. As a result most neutralizations are by random circumstance. Specific targetting is vital to the success of the program and the Vietnamese propensity for record/file keeping provides them with a solid data bank. More emphasis must be given from the top or the Phung Hoang Program will remain just another low priority government program.

#### AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Public Health: Kien Tuong province has an outstanding medical chief who runs a well-defined program and an excellently equipped hospital. Under Dr. Van's

leadership, the hospital has undergone a vast expansion in the past three years and has become a model facility.

Education: In accordance with National Policy, the province stated in the province plan that the fragmented education system would be consolidated under a single service chief with two deputies. This has not occurred and probably will not soon become a reality since the province knows that the Ministry of Education is lukewarm on this objective. In spite of non-compliance with national policy in this respect, the schools in this province have expanded and improved. The high schools have just recently created student councils. The fact that administrative responsibility is different for schools than it is for other services tends to encourage the school system to hold itself apart. A consolidation would enhance the system and facilitate the establishment of parents-teachers-students groups.

Public Works: Most provinces have a Public Works Service for lateral construction and a reconstruction service for perpendicular construction. The Public Works Service in Kien Tuong has been given both responsibilities. With a small staff it is understandable that this service leans toward project accomplishment by contract. The future development of this province depends on improvement in roads and canals and the responsible agency must be large enough and well equipped to do the work and motivate the people to contribute. Considering the small staff and scarcity of equipment the Public Works Service has done an admirable job of maintaining Kien Tuong's public facilities.

Economic Development: The vast delta Plain of Reeds in Kien Tuong is being proved feasibly cultivatable every year as the present farmers push the rotting reeds back and increase their farm plots. At first new crop land is not good but each year acidity decreases and the crop becomes better. For the cost of one small dredge for irrigation canal work, Kien Tuong Province could be changed from a near worthless to a viable agricultural area. The advent of the tractor in the province has opened up areas never before cultivated. Adequate roads would do more to develop the province than any thing else.

Land Reform: Because of the vast land area and small population in Kien Tuong this program has not been a problem. Program goals have continuously been met despite the fact that more hectares are cultivated outside of the program than under it. Disputes over land and titles have been minimal.

Domestic Production: Not economically significant. Although some products are made from reeds, total activity is low. See Economic development.

Labor: Kien Tuong has no labor service and no labor program. There are no labor unions or farmers associations which denies farmers the benefits of purchasing fertilizers and insecticides at official prices. Either one or the other should be represented in the province.

Youth Affairs: The people of this province have the usual closeness of family ties and will participate in most anything in which their children have an interest or commitment. For the past year it has been feared that VC would

attack any crowd, therefore games have not been promoted. As security improves organized athletic events will be well supported and should be encouraged.

Public Administration: The present system is a bureaucratic night mare. The systems is clogged with red tape and multiple command lines. Although some reforms are occurring at province level, they are needed at all levels. The elected officials of villages are particularly important as a link between the people of Vietnam and their government. The Village Chief has become quite a powerful individual. He commands or monitors a large contingent of military, para military forces and cadre from ministries and services assigned to his village. In addition, together with his finance commissioner, he controls large amounts and a great variety of funds. The central government depends upon province to monitor, control and audit the village since the task is too great for any single agency. The Province Finance Service is responsible for the accounts of all province villages but rarely audits, essentially only when alarming discrepancy occurs. It is submitted that the one place where the people will notice corruption more than any other is in their own village. In this area, as well as in that of the National Police which also touches everyone's life, corruption must be stamped out or every sacrifice and effort that the United States has expended here will soon be dissipated. Many people, may be most people, would accept a communist proposal including honest government and justice when they can see the opposite practiced around them. We simply must find a way to stamp out corruption at village levels. Training is helpful but has no effect whatsoever on official habit and tendencies toward malfeasance. There must be audits of accounts regularly conducted by certified public accountants not be holden to any level of government.

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13. ABSTRACT

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